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This memo presents the results of the simultaneous grenade launching 
failure investigation. The failure investigation includes tests made in the 
field at El Mirage, California, laboratory tests made at BxA to determine 
the exact cause, and tests made to verify the effectiveness of corrective 
action implemented. 
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During Space Ordnance Systems (SOS) grenade firing field tests of 
the DVT grenade launch assembly (GLA) two grenades were launched simultaneously 
on two occasions from a single simulated sequential firing command. This 
report is a summary of subsequent trouble shooting, tests, and analysis that 
identified the cause of the malfunction and demonstrated the effectivity of two 
modifications designed to prevent further multiple firings. 
Description of Incident 
Both on 10 February and 11 February, during the SOS field tests at 
El Mirage Dry Lake Bed near Palmdale, California, grenades #1 and #2 
were launched simultaneously from a single simulated sequential firing 
command. In each instance, the GLA was installed in a Mortar Box and 
the grenades were fired thru firing circuits which are installed on a PC 
board in the rr:ortar box exterior to the GLA. In each instance the GLA 1 s 
contained all four grenades. The Mortar Box electronics and GLA are 
designed to fire only one grenade at a time from seperate sequential 
commands in the sequence Grenade #2, #4, #3, and# 1. Since the GLA was 
fully loaded with all four grenades, only grenade #2. should have been launched 
when the simulated command was issued. The first scheduled firing test was 
made with the test unit (Mortar box and GLA) at ambient temperature, and 
the second with the test unit at approximately -4°F. The temperatures of 
the units, however, are not related to the malfunction. 
Neither of the grenades launched in the second test unit detonated on 
impact. This has been determined to be a seperate failure, not related to 
multiple grenade launchings and is fully discussed in a seperate report by 
SOS, who was assigned the responsibility of that failure investigation. 
Description of Firing Circuitry Design 
A functional description of the entire firing circuit design is necessary 
to evaluate the tests and analysis that is reported herein. A simplified 
schematic of the rocket motor iniator firing circuitry is shown in Figure 1. 
It should be noted that each of the five firing circuits (Fire #1, #2, #3, #4 and 
sequential) are identical, therefore, a circuit discussion can be in terms of 
only one. 
In actual lunar operation and in the field test, both the sequential (C1) 
and the regular (C2) firing capacitors, located on the Mortar Box electronic 
board, are charged to +24V to arm the firing circuits. After the circuits 
are armed, a positive 15 volt pulse is applied to the input of the unjunction 
transistor to trigger a selected grenade firing circuit. At the end of the 
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firing pulse, the unjunction transistor turns on, applying the charge of c3 
(thru the unjunction transistor) across the parallel paths of R 1 and the 
series connection D 1 , R 2 , and R 3 paralled by the 1 JL resistance of the 
iniator in the GLA. When the voltage across Rz reaches approx. 0. 7volts, 
the 5CR turns on, applying the charge of Cz (or C 1 if the sequential circuit 
is triggered) aero s s the appropriate rocket motor iniator. C 1 (and C 2) 
has a capacity of 350 p.f which when charged to 24V is sufficient to fire the 
iniators. 
During lunar operation it is planned to fire the grenades in the sequence 
of 2, 4, 3, 1. The grenades may either be fired selectively by command to 
the proper firing circuit, or in deliberate sequence by repeated sequential 
commands {after re-arming) to the sequential firing circuit thru the operation 
of micro switches 5z, 54, and 53, located in launch tubes #2, #4 and #3 
respectively. 52 is closed when Grenade #2 is launched, permitting the charge 
on C 1 to be applied to Grenade #4 when the next command is iniated. 5imilarily, 
Grenades #4 and Grenades #3 operate 5 4 and 5 3 respectively to permit firing 
of the next grenade from sequential firing commands. 
Failure Investigation 
After the first multiple grenade firing on 10 February, a thorough review 
of the circuit and a long discussion of the pro1',lem resulted in a decision to 
procede in launching the two live grenades in tile GLA to permit a complete 
and safe examination of the mortar box and GLA. Therefore, the #4 grenade 
was fired and then the #3 grenade, in the normal firing modes. Both were 
successful launches with grenade detonations. 
'Immediately after the firing of the #4 and #3 grenades the test unit was 
tested in the field to attempt to determine the cause. The test was made by 
connecting 1 ohm (resistive value of rocket motor A5Is) resistors to the GLA 
rocket motor iniator leads at the bottom of the launch tubes. Extensive firing 
tests were made by repeatedly triggering the mortar box firing circuits while 
monitoring two of the l.JV resistors simulating the iniators with an oscilloscope 
and the capac. voltage arming lines with ammeters. No anomalies were 
observed by either oscilloscope or current monitoring equipment in arming 
capacitor charging lines. It was assumed that the multiple firings were 
caused by a short in the test setup that was eliminated or removed by the #4 
and #3 jrenade firings or inmovinganddisassemblingthetestuni~ during the 
tests. Evidence of debris was found in the mortar box and on the electronic 
board although no short existed. The MB was cleaned up and R TV was applied 
to the leads to the electronic board. A thorough electrical and functional check 
of the MB (regular and sequential firing modes} was made. 
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Immediately after the second multiple firing in the second test unit, 
the above tests were repeated again using l-'\_., resistors with no indications 
of a malfunction. ASI "headers" were then procured by SOS to use in place 
of the l.JV resistors to more realistically simulate iniator firings. 
"Headers" are partially assembled ASI's, with only dud bridgewires, the 
base, and pins. The headers burn open when fired, simulating an ASI or 
SBASI iniator. 
Firing tests were again made using headers instead of resistors to 
simulate the rocket motor iniators. Single simulated sequential commands 
to either the sequential firing circuit or the Grenade # 1 firing circuit now 
caused two headers (at Grenade #2 and Grenade #1) to ignite, duplicating 
the malfunction. The tests were repeated using a different GLA and again 
using a second Mortar Box with either of the GLAs. In all cases the tests 
repeatedly demonstrated double firing of headers from either a simulated 
firing command to the sequential firing circuit or Grenade # l firing circuit 
in the regular firing mode. 
Oscilloscope traces were obtained during these tests showing the 
time correlation between the double iniations. One of these photograph of 
these traces is shown in Figure 2. All traces taken of multiple firings were 
similar varying only slightly in indicated time required to iniate a header. An 
additional important observation was made. Every multiple firing indicated --]--
that both the sequential and the regular arming capacitors were discharging 
indicating that both regular and sequential firing circuits were being triggered. 
These tests indicated that the high current pulse to the grenade #2 J 
iniator (sequentially fired) was generating a transient which was coupling 
into the grenade # 1 firing circuit. The transient occurs when the bridge-
wire of the initiator opens up and does not occur when a 1 ohm resistor is 
used in place of headers or SBASis. A further test was made to isolate the 
failure mode to either the GLA or the mortar box electronics. The GLA was 
removed from the mortar box and the headers connected directly to the firing 
leads at the mortar box/ GLA connector. Repeated firing tests indicated only 
one header was iniated at a time with no anomalies. In examining the wiring 
of the one GLA after this series of tests, the wiring in the GLA was disturbed, 
seperating the leads of Grenade #1 and #2. The iniator leads to these two 
grenades are run pressed together along one side of the GLA. After this 
examination and inadvertent seperation of the leads, multiple header firings 
could not be repeated with this GLA. The inability to fire two headers when 
connected directly to the connector and with the GLA after spreading the 
wires tended to _substantiate the theory th~.J.E_,~~~~~~"~~~LS2,3;;,P~d 
intheGLA. -
Figure 2 
Firing pulse across headers 
installed in GLA. 
Top trace at Grenade #2 header 
{Fired Sequentially) 
Bottom trace at Grenade # 1 
header (Induced Firing) 
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Prior to concluding the preliminary investigation while in the field a test 
was made to verify that the multiple firings was not due to dual triggering at 
the input of the firing circuit thru coupling in the fifty foot firing leads from the 
fire control center to the launch pad. In this test, headers were connected to 
the GLA installed in a mortar box, and all except the sequential firing circuits 
were grounded at the input of the mortar box electronics at the mortar box 
adapter board. Again, when simulated sequential firing commands were 
iniated to grenade #2, both grenades # 1 and #2 ignited, verifying that the 
triggering was not exterior to the mortar box/ GLA combination. 
Although the malfunction during the field test occurred with Grenade #2 
and# l when grenade #2 was fired sequentially, a series of tests were made to 
determine if the malfunction was unique to #2 and # 1 circuits. During this 
series of tests, headers were placed in all four grenades, but the microswitches 
were operated to place selected grenades in the sequential firing circuit. $cL 
Prior to leaving SOS, /the film of the multiple launchings were also .~,.---""""""''~···· ~· 
examined, in particular to observe the timing of the multiple lau~h~_. .• ~ The 
films indicate that the grenade # 1 was launched approximatelG'ot;J. sec. after 
grenade #2, consistent with the timing indicated by the photographs of multiple 
header firings. This evidence eliminates the possibility that the dual launchings 
were due to the shock environment. The shock generated by grenade #2, would 
occur several milliseconds after the iniator in grenade #2 was ignited since it 
takes several milliseconds to ignite the propellant to thrust the grenade and 
generate a shock. If the second grenade iniator was fired by microswitch 
operation or by electromagnetic/ electrostatic energy due to the shock or blast 
the films would show the second grenade exiting the launch tube more than 8 
frames after grenade #2 since the frame rate was approximately 250 ).1 seconds 
per frame. Actually the films show the grenades exiting within one frame of 
each other. 
Detailed tests and Analysis 
Two mortar boxes and two GLA 1 s were returned to BxA for extensive 
tests to determine the exact cause of the malfunction and to verify the effective-
ness of subsequent modifications. For these tests, 100 dual bridgewire headers 
were obtained from SOS for destructive tests. 
Functional Tests with Headers 
On February 16, the motar boxes and GLA 1 s were connected together in 
the laboratory and the unit operated thru the S/ S test set. A dual beam 
oscilloscope again was used to obtain the signal across the headers when 
grenades were fired sequentially. 
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Of ten firings only one multiple header firing was observed. It was then 
assumed that the GLA leads were no longer tightly coupled to generate enough 
cross coupling to induce false triggering. Further tests were then made using 
a dummy GLA made with all four positive firing leads tightly compressed to-
gether in one group, and the four ground leads tightly coupled together in a 
second group. The ground leads were soldered together with one only connect-
ed to the GLA/MB connector to simulate actual GLA single point grounding. 
Each of the four positive leads were connected to the proper pin. With this 
test fixture (or dummy GLA) every test made with all four headers connected 
duplicate multiple grenade launchings by igniting two headers and discharging 
both sequential and regular capacitors regardless of which firing circuit was 
triggered. The timing of the ignition of headers was identical to those obtained 
while at the El Mirage test site and is again shown in Figure 3. 
Analysis of the traces indicated that a negative voltage was being induced 
on the cathode of the SCR while the trigger of the SCR was maintained at or 
near ground. Note from Figure 2 and Figure 3 that the second firing pulse 
(measured across the header) is triggered at the time of ignition of the first 
header. At this time the current due to the first pulse falls rapidly to zero 
since the 1 ....v header has opened up making the impedance infinite. The 
collapse of the current induces a negative voltage in the second pair of leads 
which is connected to the SCR cathode (Figure 1). The negative pulse i.:cd -·ed 
at the SCR was photographed both with a GLA and with the dummy GLA connected 
to the mortar box electronics. Reproductions of these photographs showing the 
induced signal characteristics is shown in Figure 4 and 5. Figure 4 is a trace 
of the pulse induced with a GLA. Figure 5 is a trace of the pulse induced with 
the dummy GLA (Worst Case W~ring). 
Modification and Retests 
Any one of the following modifications were proven, by tests, to be 
sufficient to prevent multiple firings: 
1. Desensitize the firing circuits to eliminate the effect of the negative 
induced transient. 
2. Arm only one arming capacitor such that there would be sufficient 
energy to ignite an iniator. 
3. Rewire the GLA to eliminate or reduce the negative transient. 
Figure 3 
Firing pulse across headers with worse case wiring 
(Dw:nmy GLA). Top trace at Grenade #2 header 
(Fired Sequentially). Bottom trace @ Grenade # 1 
header (Induced Firing.) 
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Desensitization of Firing Circuits 
The first modification was incorporated by decreasing the value of the 
resistor between the cathode and the trigger of the SCR (R2) of Figure 1 and 
increasing the value of the unjunction resistor R 1 , R 2 was originally 1. 2 K f\... 
and R 1 was originally 4 7 ..J\.. • From Figure 1, it is obvious that with R2 >) 
R 1 the trigger is near ground potential (less the Diode drop}, With R2 << R 1 , 
the potential at the trigger is very near the potential of the cathode, thus the 
negative voltage is essentially applied to both the trigger and the cathode and 
false triggering does not occur, This modification was made on all five firing 
circuits. The effectiveness of this desensitizing the firing circuits was then 
verified by connecting the modified circuit to the dummy GLA (worst case 
wiring) and performing firing tests with headers. 38 tests were performed 
with the dummy GLA with no evidence of dual firings from oscilloscopes 
monitorings. In these tests both arming capacitors were charged and in no 
test did both discharge. 21 tests were also performed after the circuit was 
modified with the GLA that had been brought back from El M',rage with no 
evidence of multiple firings. 
In addition to destructive firing tests, two other tests were made to verify 
the circuit performance after modification. 
In the first test, negative pulses were applied directly to the cathode of 
the SCR using a Rutherford pulse generator. The amplitude versus pulse 
width at the triggering level was then determined for firing circuits both 
before and after modifying the circuit. 
This test indicates the circuits are very significantly desensitized to 
negative transients. The pulse width of the induced pulse with a GLA is 
between . 2 and . 3 )-1 sec. This test indicates that prior to modifying the 
circuit, induced triggering would occur with a negative pulse amplitude 
between 2 and 4 volts. After modification, the circuit is shown to insensi-
tive to pulse of almost 40 volts at these pulse widths. The results of this 
negative pulse test is shown in Table 1. 
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Modified Unmodified 
80 (no fire) 
40 
42 
30 
17 
10 
6. 0 
5. 0 
4. 5 
6. 0 
6.0 
6 v 
4 v 
z v 
L3V 
. 8 v 
. 7 v 
. 5 v 
. 5 v 
. 5 v 
. 5 v 
. 5 v 
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A second set of tests was made to determine the minimum pulse at the 
input to the firing circuit required to trigger the SCR after the circuit was 
modified. This test was made by gradually increasing the width of the input 
pulse to the unjunction transistor until switching of the unjunction provided 
sufficient drive to trigger the SCR. As shown by test data in Table II, there 
is an insignificant increase in sensitivity indicated by the small decrease in 
pulse width required to cause the SCR to trigger. 
Modification of Arming Capacitor Circuitry 
This rnodification would be made by modifying the central electronics 
logic. However, to test the effectiveness of the modification, the test set up 
was modified to supply only voltage to arm one of the firing capacitors. (C 1 
or C 2 reference Figure 1} Fifteen tests were made with only one capacitor 
charged with no evidence of multiple firings. Incorporation of this modification, 
however, would require extensive modification of the ASE central electronics 
logic. Since desensitizing the SCR circuit and the rewiring the GLA, each 
individually effectively eleminates multiple firing, this modification is not 
planned. ~-----···--
-
Modification of GLA Wiring 
A study of the GLA wiring shows that only Grenades # 1 and #2 firing 
circuit leads are coupled together for any significant distance in the GLA. 
Grenades #3 and #4 are near each other for less than 3 inches. SOS has been 
instructed to rewire all GLAs with twisted pairs for grenade # 1 and #2. The \ lsvf 
effectivity of twisting pairs was tested in the laboratory. All four pairs of \ ~ 
wires were twisted approximately 3 turns per inch for the lab tests. The 4 
twisted pairs leads were then tightly boundled together and firing tests performed.~~· 
Fifteen tests were made with no evidence of multiple firings. In addition, the f ..... frr::L 
negative signal at the SCR cathode was again photographed. The photographs of f ~· 
the transient with twisted pairs show high frequency ripple for a time duration i ,
2
,1r.() 
of less than . 2 }1 seconds with an amplitude of less than . 8 V peak to peak. The J4~ 
signal photographed is actually meaningless since the ripple frequency observeJd. 
is greater than 40 me which could be picked up by the scope probe ground 
connector acting as an antenna. The traces on the photograph are not repro-
ducible for this report and are not included. 
Summary 
Complete testing of the mortar box and GLA have conclusively established 
the cause for the multiple firing. The exact cause is a negative transient on the 
SCR of# 1 grenade which triggers this circuit due to close coupling of firing 
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Table II 
Firing Circuit Sensitivity Test 
Pulse Repetition Rate Min PW required to trigger SCR 
Unmodified Modified 
Firing Cht # l 
1 per 28 sec 6. 6 m sec 6. 2m sec 
1 per 2.8 sec 6. 6 m sec 6. 2m sec 
1 per . 280 sec 6. 2m sec 5. 7 m sec 
1 per . 140 sec 6. 0 m sec 5. 5 m sec 
Firing Cht #2 
1 per 28 sec 4.4 m sec 4. 5 m sec 
1 per 2. 8 sec 4.4 m sec 4. 5 m sec 
1 per . 280 sec 4.1 m sec 5. 2m sec 
1 per . 140 sec 3. 7 m sec 3. 9 m sec 
Firing Cht # 3 
l per 28 sec 7.1 m sec 
1 per 2.8 sec 7.1 m sec 
l per . 280 sec 6. 7 m sec 
l per . 140 sec 6.4 m sec 
Firing Cht #4 
l per 28 sec 6.1 m sec 
l per 2.8 sec 6.1 m sec 
per . 280 sec 5. 7 m sec 
1 per . 140 sec 5. 4 m sec 
Sequential Firing Cht 
1 per 28 sec 6.6 m sec 
1 per 2.8 sec 6. 6 m sec 
1 per . 280 sec 6. 2m sec 
per . 140 sec 6.0 m sec 
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leads in the GLA. Contributing causes were identified as SCR circuit sensi-
tivity and the arming of both sequential and regular circuits. 
Tests were made that verified that either reducing the coupling, or 
desensitizing the firing circuits, or charging only one arming capacitor would 
effectively prevent multiple firings. As a result of this investigation, two of 
the modifications were incorporated into hardware; 1.) twisting the firing leads 
to decrease coupling and 2.) changing bias and load resistors in the mortar box 
electronic board firing circuits to desensitize the SCR. 
